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Arizona Lawyer Search - Listings for Leas Catherine Atty
Name: Leas Catherine Atty
Address: 10451 W Palmeras Dr Ste 213 Sun City, AZ 85373
Phone Number: 623-875-9501
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Specialties:
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Elder Law
Wills, Estates, Trusts & Probate Law
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Cases related to this attorney's specialties:
IN RE: VENEMAN ANN, U.S. DC Circuit Court of AppealsIN RE: VENEMAN ANN 1000 United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT Argued September 6, 2002 Decided October 29, 2002 No. 02-5021 In re: Ann M. Veneman, Secretary of Agriculture, Petitioner Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 99cv03119) Charles W. Scarborough, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Robert M. Loeb, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice. Joseph M. Sellers argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Suzette M. Malveaux, Alexander Pires, Jr., David Frantz, and Phillip L. Fraas. Michael L. Foreman, Elaine R. Jones, Norman J. Chach- kin, Paul M. Smith, Ian Heath Gershengorn, and John Dossett were on the brief for amici curiae in support of respondents. Before: Tatel and Garland, Circuit Judges, and Williams, Senior Circuit Judge. Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Tatel. Tatel, Circuit Judge: Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits certification of class actions not "exclusively or predominantly [for] money damages." This petition for interlocutory review presents the following ques- tion: In a case involving requests for both monetary and equitable relief, may a district court certify a Rule 23(b)(2) class as to equitable relief only without first determining whether, looking at the complaint as a whole, plaintiffs' monetary claims predominate over their equitable claims? Although this issue is both unsettled and fundamental- factors that may justify interlocutory review pursuant to Rule 23(f)-we nevertheless deny the petition because the critical questions required to resolve it are entirely unbriefed and because we are satisfied that the issue will not escape appel- late review. I. The United States Department of Agriculture administers ...
SIERRA CLUB v. SEABOARD FARMS, INC. FILED United States Court of Appeals 1000 Tenth Circuit OCT 28 2004 PATRICK FISHER Clerk PUBLISH UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT SIERRA CLUB, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. No. 03-6104 SEABOARD FARMS INC. and SEABOARD CORPORATION, Delaware corporations, and SHAWNEE FUNDING LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a Delaware partnership, Defendants-Appellees. TYSON FOODS INC., Amicus Curiae. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA (D.C. NO. CIV-00-997-C) Barclay B. Rogers (Patrick Gallagher and David Bookbinder with him on the briefs), Sierra Club, San Francisco, CA, for Appellant. Ellen B. Steen (Richard E. Schwartz and Kirsten L. Nathanson with her on the brief), Crowell & Moring LLP, Washington, DC, for Appellee. Judith A. Villines, Stites & Harbison, PLLC, Frankfort, Kentucky, and Laura D. Keller, James W. Taylor, and W. Blaine Early, Stites & Harbison, PLLC, Lexington, Kentucky on the brief for Amicus Curiae. Before HENRY, BRISCOE, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges. HENRY, J., Sierra Club, Inc. appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants, Seaboard Farms Inc., Seaboard Corporation, and Shawnee Funding Limited Partnership (together, "Seaboard"), who own and operate a pig-farming operation in western Oklahoma. This case turns on the meaning of the word "facility" as used in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act's section 103(a) ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. 9603(a). CERCLA's Section 103(a) sets out various reporting requirements for the release of hazardous substances from a facility; here we focus on the ammonia emissions from Appellee's concentrated animal feeding operation located in western Oklahoma. CERCLA's statutory definition of this term is somewhat turbid, but, when read with other provisions nearby, is unambiguous. The district court found that the term "facility" should be narrowly construed so as to apply to each individ...
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